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THE CONFLICT BETWEEN FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSES
AND STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS: WHY ILLINOIS
GOT IT RIGHT IN JANE DOE V. MATCH.COM
MARTY GOULD*
INTRODUCTION
Jane Doe, a young woman from Chicago, Illinois, signed up for
Match.com, the well-known Internet dating website.1 Like tens of thousands of other Chicago-area Match.com subscribers, Jane was looking to
meet a nice young man—a Chicago guy who had similar interests and values. Match.com “matched” Jane Doe with Ryan Logan.2 In December
2009, Jane and Ryan went on a date in Chicago, and during that date, Jane
was sexually abused and raped.3
According to the allegations in Jane Doe’s complaint, prior to “matching” Jane Doe and Ryan Logan, Match.com received a written notice from
another of its Chicago-area female subscribers, J.N., alerting Match.com
that Ryan Logan raped J.N after the two were introduced to one another on
the site and met for a social encounter.4 Despite receiving this written
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* The author is an attorney at Romanucci & Blandin, LLC. He graduated from Chicago-Kent College of
Law in 2014 and received his bachelor’s degree from Northwestern University. The author would like
to thank Daniel S. Kirschner and Professor Henry H. Perritt, Jr. for their invaluable guidance and comments.
1. Jane Doe v. Match.com, L.L.C., No. 11 L 3249, slip op. at 1 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 25, 2012)
(order granting plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment, denying motion to dismiss, and transferring case for further proceedings).
2. Id.
3. Id. In November 2010, Ryan Logan was found guilty of the criminal sexual assault against
Jane Doe. See Marc Karlinsky, Match.com Must Face Dispute over User, CHI. DAILY L. BULL. (Dec.
18, 2013),
http://www.corboydemetrio.com/media/publication/58_15454%20Corboy%20reprint%20Dec182013.pdf. The Cook County judge later vacated the conviction and found Ryan Logan guilty of unlawful restraint and criminal sexual abuse, a lesser charge, instead. Jason Meisner, Man Gets 90 Days in
Jail for Sex Abuse, Restraint, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25, 2011,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-02-25/news/ct-met-date-rape-sentence-20110225_1_judgevacates-assault-charges-restraint.
4. Jane Doe, No. 11 L 3249, slip op. at 1; Karlinsky, supra note 3. While convicted of raping
Jane Doe, Ryan Logan was acquitted of sexual assault for the J.N. incident that allegedly occurred two
years earlier. See Matthew Walberg, Man Who Used Online Dating Site Convicted of Assault: Judge
Acquits Him in Second Case, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 9, 2010,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-11-09/news/ct-met-match-com-rape-20101109_1_sexualassault-judge-acquits-match-com.

36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 164 Side B

03/25/2015 13:32:44

10P - GOULD FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

672

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

3/5/2015 12:41 PM

[Vol 90:2

03/25/2015 13:32:44

5. Second Amended Complaint at Law at 2–5, Jane Doe v. Match.com, L.L.C., No. 11 L 3249
(Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 23, 2011).
6. See generally id.
7. Id. at 14.
8. See, e.g., Dawdy v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 797 N.E.2d 687, 694 (Ill. 2003) (holding that “[a]
plaintiff’s right to select the forum is substantial . . . [and] should rarely be disturbed”).
9. Defendant Match.com, L.L.C.’s Section 2-619 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint at Law at exhibit 1, at cl. 23, Jane Doe v. Match.com, L.L.C., No. 11 L 3249 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
July 6, 2011) [hereinafter Match.com Motion to Dismiss].
10. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 259 (2014).
11. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 615/1 to -55 (West 2008).
12. See infra Parts I.A & B.

36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 164 Side B

warning concerning Ryan Logan, Match.com failed to remove Ryan from
its service, failed to contact the Chicago Police Department, and failed to
warn other customers, like Jane Doe, who interacted online with Ryan.5
In 2011, Jane Doe filed a civil suit against Match.com and Ryan Logan in an Illinois state court asserting, inter alia, claims of negligence,
willful and wanton misconduct, and violation of the Illinois Dating Referral
Services Act against Match.com,6 and claims of battery and intentional
infliction of emotional distress against Ryan Logan.7 Generally, the plaintiff in a civil case has the right to choose the forum in which her dispute
will be heard, so long as the forum chosen is one that has subject matter
jurisdiction over the controversy and personal jurisdiction over the defendant.8 Because Jane was a resident of Illinois, Match.com advertised its services to Illinois consumers, Jane used Match.com’s services while in
Illinois, and the rape occurred in Illinois by another Illinois resident—one
would naturally assume that Illinois would be the proper venue to decide
Jane’s case.
However, there was one problem: Match.com’s Terms of Use Agreement contained a choice of law and forum selection clause that required
any disputes arising out of a subscriber’s use of its website or service to be
resolved under Texas law in a Dallas, Texas courtroom.9 A forum selection
clause is a provision in a contract designating a particular forum—such as a
specific state, county, or court—as the only proper venue in which the parties to an agreement must litigate any future disputes.10 To complicate matters further, Illinois has a consumer protection statute, called the Illinois
Dating Referral Services Act (IDRSA)11 which applies to any contract between a dating enterprise and an Illinois consumer for dating services.
Match.com’s Terms of Use Agreement, including the choice of law and
forum selection clause, is directly in conflict with several provisions of the
IDRSA—particularly the IDRSA’s “anti-waiver” provision.12
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13. Jane Doe v. Match.com, L.L.C., No. 11 L 3249, slip op. at 7 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 25, 2012).
14. See Gamayo v. Match.com L.L.C., No. C 11-00762 SBA, 2011 WL 3739542, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 24, 2011) (Match.com’s terms of use agreement directly conflicted with certain provisions of
the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act); Brodsky v. Match.com L.L.C., No. 09 Civ. 5328(NRB),
2009 WL 3490277, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2009) (Match.com’s terms of use agreement directly
conflicted with certain provisions of the New York Dating Referral Services Law).
15. Jane Doe, No. 11 L 3249, slip op. at 7.
16. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
17. See Jane Doe, No. 11 L 3249, slip op. at 1.
18. Brodsky, 2009 WL 3490277.
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The issue here is, what is the stronger, more significant interest—the
forum state’s laws or forum selection clauses that abrogate the forum
state’s laws? In that vein, should Match.com’s forum selection clause be
enforceable despite being in conflict with the IDRSA? In other words, to
what extent can companies contract out of state consumer protection statutes (such as the IDRSA) through the use of choice of law and forum selection clauses in standard form adhesion contracts?
The only court in Illinois to rule on the issue held that the IDRSA
voids forum-selection clauses opposing the stated Illinois public policy, as
declared by Illinois statutes.13 Outside of Illinois, however, federal courts
have held that the exact same Match.com forum-selection clause was valid
and enforceable despite being in direct conflict with similar statutes in other states.14 While the Illinois court permitted the plaintiff to pursue her
claims in Illinois,15 other federal courts considering the same issue held
that, pursuant to Match.com’s forum selection clause, the claims against
Match.com must be pursued in a Dallas, Texas court.16 These cases represent a split in decision and analysis—pitting the values of individual autonomy against federalism and a state’s right to choose how it protects its citicitizens. This Article takes the position that the Illinois court arrived at the
correct result.
Part I of this Article discusses Jane Doe v. Match.com17—the relevant
Illinois case. Part II discusses Brodsky v. Match.com,18 one of the main
Match.com cases at odds with the Illinois decision. Part III discusses why
the Illinois case is correct, highlighting the legal reasons under both Illinois
and federal law. Finally, Part IV discusses why public policy reasons justify and support the conclusion reached by the Illinois court.
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I. THE ILLINOIS CASE: JANE DOE V. MATCH.COM
A. The Illinois Dating Referral Services Act

03/25/2015 13:32:44

19. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 615/1 to -55 (West 2008).
20. Jane Doe, No. 11 L 3249, slip op. at 6.
21. Christine des Garennes, Breaking Dating Service Contract Not Hard to Do, NEWS GAZETTE,
Feb. 15, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 2195754.
22. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 615/15.
23. Id. (emphasis added).
24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 45.
27. Id.
28. Id. § 35(b).
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In 1991, the Illinois state legislature enacted the IDRSA.19 The IDRSA
was enacted to protect Illinois citizens using dating referral services.20 As
Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan stated, “Online dating and similar
services are just like any other business. . . . Consumers who try them and
use them have certain rights under the Illinois consumer protection laws.”21
The language in the IDRSA is straightforward. To be valid and enforceable, a contract between a dating referral services company and an
Illinois consumer has to meet a number of requirements, including:
1. The contract must be in writing;22
2. The contract contains “all provisions, requirements, and prohibitions that are mandated by [the] Act . . . before it is signed
by the customer”;23
3. A copy of the written contract is provided to the customer “at
the time the customer signs the contract”;24 and
4. The company must “maintain original copies of all contracts
for services for as long as the contracts are in effect and for a
period of 3 years thereafter.”25
In addition to these technical requirements, the IDRSA also contains a
remedies provision.26 Section 45 of the Act grants injured Illinois consumers the right to recover an amount equal to three times actual damages, plus
costs and attorney fees.27 To further protect Illinois consumers—and as
particularly relevant here—the IDRSA mandates that “[a]ny waiver by the
customer of the provisions of this Act shall be void and unenforceable.”28
The IDRSA’s “anti-waiver” provision is of particular importance because it
represents the Illinois legislature’s intention to explicitly forbid Illinois
consumers from “contracting out” or “waiving” the very laws designed to
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protect them.29 Anti-waiver provisions are quite common in Illinois consumer protection statutes30 and in consumer protection statutes in many
other states.31
The provisions and requirements of the IDRSA apply to every contract
for dating referral services.32 If a contract for dating referral services does
not comply with any of the provisions of the IDRSA, the contract is void
and unenforceable.33
B. Match.com’s Terms of Use Agreement Violates the IDRSA

03/25/2015 13:32:44

29. See also William J. Woodward, Jr., Constraining Opt-Outs: Shielding Local Law and Those It
Protects from Adhesive Choice of Law Clauses, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 9, 12–13 (2006) [hereinafter
Woodward, Constraining Opt-Outs].
30. See, e.g., Illinois Credit Services Organizations Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/8 (West
2008) (“Any waiver by a buyer of the provisions of this Act shall be deemed void and unenforceable by
a credit services organization as contrary to public policy”); Illinois Pre-Need Cemetery Sales Act, 815
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 390/25 (West 2008) (“Any provision of any contract which purports to waive
any provision of this Act shall be null and void”).
31. Woodward, Constraining Opt-Outs, supra note 29, at 13 n.8 (citing numerous state consumer
protection statutes that forbid the waiver of the protections they provide).
32. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 615/15.
33. Id. § 35(c).
34. Match.com Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at exhibit 1, at cl. 7, 8(b) & 21.
35. Jane Doe v. Match.com, L.L.C., No. 11 L 3249, slip op. at 5 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 25, 2012).
36. Fertelmeyster v. Match.com, L.P., No. 02 CH 11534, slip op. at 4–5 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 18,
2003).
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Match.com’s Terms of Use Agreement failed to comply with the
IDRSA in several ways. On its face, the Terms of Use Agreement failed to
meet a number of the above-listed requirements. For example,
Match.com’s contract contained exculpatory and limitation of damages
provisions in direct contradiction to the IDRSA’s remedies provision,
which allows injured Illinois customers to recover an amount equal to three
times actual damages, plus costs and attorney fees.34 Given that
Match.com’s Terms of Use Agreement was “designed to apply to users in
all 50 states,”35 it is not surprising that the contract failed to comply with a
number of the requirements set forth in the IDRSA. Moreover,
Match.com’s failure to meet the requirements under the IDRSA was also
likely of no surprise to Match.com, as another Illinois court in 2003 approved a settlement agreement in which Match.com agreed to correct the
alleged contractual violations in its future subscription agreements.36
In Jane Doe v. Match.com, the Illinois court held that Match.com’s
Terms of Use Agreement was void and unenforceable in its entirety because it was in conflict with the IDRSA and “the strong public policy un-
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derlying [the] statute.”37 While there were several violations of the Act, the
Illinois court paid particular attention to Match.com’s violation of the
IDRSA’s anti-waiver provision.38 The court found that by designating Texas as the exclusive forum and imposing Texas law on Illinois consumers,
Match.com’s forum selection and choice of law clauses constituted an impermissible waiver by the customer of all the provisions of the IDRSA.39
The court reasoned that if it enforced the forum selection and choice of law
clauses, “Match.com users in Illinois would lose protections that the Illinois legislature created for them through enacting [the] IDRSA.”40
C. Complicating the Decision with Conflicts of Law Issues

03/25/2015 13:32:44

37. Jane Doe, No. 11 L 3249, slip op. at 4.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Woodward, Constraining Opt-Outs, supra note 29, at 13.
42. See, e.g., Match.com Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at exhibit 1, at cl. 23.
43. See Gamayo v. Match.com L.L.C., No. C 11-00762 SBA, 2011 WL 3739542, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 24, 2011).
44. Match.com Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at exhibit 1, at cl. 23.
45. Woodward, Constraining Opt-Outs, supra note 29, at 13.
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Although the Illinois court’s decision seems straightforward, it is far
from it. Complications arise from the use of both forum selection and
choice of law clauses in a contract.41 A typical forum selection clause may
read: “If there is any dispute concerning this Agreement, suit must be
brought [exclusively] in a state or federal court in Texas.”42 Forum selection clauses designate which forum a dispute between the parties must be
heard, but not the law that must be applied. Therefore, Match.com argued
that if Illinois transfers Jane’s case to Texas, Illinois public policy as declared by the IDRSA would not necessarily be violated because Texas
courts could still apply Illinois law and find the contract void.43
Complications also arise when a choice of law clause enters into the
mix. While Match.com’s Terms of Use Agreement did not contain an actual “waiver” of the provisions of the IDRSA (i.e., the contract did not require Jane to forgo any protections provided under Illinois law), it did
include a choice of law clause stating that all disputes arising between the
parties would be governed by the laws of Texas.44 In these situations,
choice of law clauses combined with forum selection clauses, can serve as
the “functional equivalent of [a] waiver without the use of the term.”45 Be-
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46. Id. at 13–15.
47. Id. at 14.
48. Jane Doe v. Match.com, L.L.C., No. 11 L 3249, slip op. at 4 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 25, 2012).
49. Id. at 3.
50. Id.
51. Gamayo v. Match.com L.L.C., No. C 11-00762 SBA, 2011 WL 3739542, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 24, 2011).
52. See id. (Match.com makes this argument).
53. Id.
54. See id. at *3.
55. Id. at *6.
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cause Match.com’s “waiver” of the IDRSA’s provisions came in the form
of a choice of law clause, conflicts of law issues arose.46
Conflicts of law issues concern the relationship states have with one
another. Each state has its own protections and rules governing those within their jurisdiction.47 Therefore, in Jane Doe v. Match.com, the Illinois
court could not simply decide the contracts issue of whether Match.com’s
Terms of Use Agreement was valid. Rather, the court first had to determine
the conflicts of law issue, asking whether Illinois law (the law of the forum) or Texas law (the law designated by the choice of law clause) governed the validity of the contract between the parties.48 Accordingly, in
Jane Doe v. Match.com, the Illinois court first held that the validity of the
contract should be determined by Illinois law and not Texas law.49 Only
after it determined whether the Match.com contract was valid as a whole,
would the court then consider the validity of the specific forum selection
and choice of law clauses.50
Conversely, some federal courts have taken an entirely different approach to the same choice of law issues, leading to different results for the
plaintiffs involved. For example, one California federal court (dealing with
the same Match.com contract at issue in the Jane Doe case) transferred the
plaintiff’s case to Texas before it determined whether the contract was even
valid.51 By focusing on just the forum selection clause, Match.com can
argue that if the forum state transfers Jane’s case to Texas, Illinois public
policy as declared by the IDRSA would not necessarily be violated because
Texas courts could still apply Illinois law and find the contract void.52 The
court in Gamayo v. Match.com relied, in part, on this argument when it
transferred the plaintiff’s case from California to Texas.53 Relying on federal precedent, the court presumed the enforcement of forum selection
clauses and completely sidestepped any choice of law considerations or
determinations.54 The court held that it was for Texas to determine “which
state’s laws apply . . . .”55 In rejecting the contention that the enforcement
of Match.com’s forum selection clause would contravene California’s pub-
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lic policy as declared by its consumer protection statutes, the court reasoned that such an argument “required speculation as to which law the
transferee would ultimately apply.”56 “[O]nce in the proper venue, the
[p]laintiff is free to argue for the application of California law.”57 In theory,
this argument has some merit.
However, the notion that the Texas court will apply the forum court’s
laws is a fallacy in practice, underscoring the accuracy of the Illinois
court’s decision in Jane Doe v. Match.com when determining whether the
contract was valid under Illinois law rather than Texas law. More often
than not, when cases are transferred to a new forum, the transferee court’s
laws are applied, particularly when there is a choice of law provision involved.58 In Gamayo, when the plaintiffs’ case was transferred, it was unsurprising that the Texas federal court applied Texas law instead of
California law, even though many of the plaintiffs’ claims were based primarily on protections afforded by California consumer protection statutes.59
The applicability of state law can lead to different results for the plaintiffs
involved. In Gamayo, Texas law applied, which generally affords fewer
consumer protections than California laws,60 and the plaintiffs’ claims were
dismissed with prejudice.61 A similar outcome resulted in several other
cases against Match.com, which were originally filed in more consumer
friendly states, such as New York, and later transferred to Texas.62
The Illinois court’s choice of law decision in Jane Doe v. Match.com
was correct for two additional reasons. First, enforcing a forum selection

36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 167 Side B
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56. Id. (citing Besag v. Customer Decorators, Inc., No. C 08–05463 JSW, 2009 WL 330934, at
*14 (N.D. Cal. Feb.10, 2009)).
57. Id. (quoting Mazzola v. Roomster Corp., No. CV 10–5954 AHM (JCGx), 2010 WL 4916610,
at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2010) (quotation marks omitted)).
58. See, e.g., id. at *2 (discussing Brodsky v. Match.com, L.L.C., No. 3-09-CV-2066-F-BD.,
2010 WL 3895513, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2010), where a Texas federal court applied Texas law to
plaintiffs’ claims against Match.com, even though the case was originally filed in New York under New
York consumer protection and contract laws and later transferred to Texas by the New York federal
court).
59. Robinson v. Match.com, L.L.C., 3:10-CV-2651-L, 2012 WL 3263992, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Tex.
Aug. 10, 2012).
60. The American Tort Reform Association (ATRA), an organization dedicated to criticizing
laws favorable to plaintiff’s personal injury firms and the consumers they represent, argues that California is the worst “judicial hellhole” for businesses in part because of its “plaintiff-friendly consumer
laws.” AMER. TORT REFORM FOUND., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES (2013–2014), available at
http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/JudicialHellholes-2013.pdf; see also Erin
Coe, Calif.’s ‘Judicial Hellhole’ Ranking Doesn’t Tell Full Story, LAW360 (Dec. 19, 2013),
http://www.law360.com/articles/497438/calif-s-judicial-hellhole-ranking-doesn-t-tell-full-story.
61. Robinson, 2012 WL 3263992, at *19, aff’d, Malsom v. Match.com, L.L.C., 540 F. App’x. 412
(5th Cir. 2013) (applying Texas law).
62. See, e.g., Brodsky, 2010 WL 3895513, at *3 (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims for fraud, fraudulent inducements, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act, which were all initially filed in New York federal court under New York law).

36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 168 Side A

03/25/2015 13:32:44

10P - GOULD FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

3/5/2015 12:41 PM

CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS

679

clause before determining whether that contract was even valid in the first
place puts the “cart before the horse.” Second, and most notably, the Illinois decision followed clear Illinois precedent and choice of law rules.63
This holding can be better understood through the lens of basic conflict of
law and choice of law principles.
Under conflict of law principles, when there is a dispute regarding
which state’s laws to apply and no forum selection clause exists, the forum
court determines the governing law by using its own choice of law approach.64 Generally speaking, in most contract cases, Illinois courts follow
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and apply the “most significant relationship rule,” where the law of the state that is most significantly
related to the outcome of the litigation applies.65 In “the most significant
relationship” analysis, Illinois courts will also consider the state’s public
policy principles and how those policies impact the litigation.66
However, when there is a forum selection clause, as there was in the
Jane Doe v. Match.com case, Illinois courts have refused to apply the law
of the forum selected when the contract or provision is at odds with Illinois
public policy. As the Illinois Supreme Court held in First National Bank v.
Malpractice Research,67 Illinois courts are prohibited from “rely[ing] on
foreign law to enforce a contract that is illegal in the forum, and Illinois has
the stronger interest in the outcome of the controversy.”68 Illinois’s reasoning is drawn in part from the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §
187(2), which states:

Nevertheless, while there is much to be said about the best order in
which courts should decide these conflicts of law disputes (and the different conflicts of law approaches used by various state and federal courts),

03/25/2015 13:32:44

63. See, e.g., Scentura Creations, Inc. v. Long, 756 N.E.2d 451, 456–57 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
64. Soc’y of Mount Carmel v. Nat’l Ben Franklin Ins. Co. of Ill., 643 N.E.2d 1280, 1286 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1994) (emphasis added).
65. See, e.g.,Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 N.E.2d 893, 905 (Ill. 2007).
66. See Morris B. Chapman & Assocs., Ltd. v. Kitzman, 739 N.E.2d 1263, 1269–71 (Ill. 2000).
67. First Nat’l Bank of Springfield v. Malpractice Research, Inc., 688 N.E.2d 1179, 1182 (Ill.
1997).
68. Id.
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971) (emphasis added).
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The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual
rights and duties will be applied . . . unless . . . application of the law of
the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state
which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188,
would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective
choice of law by the parties.69
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this Article will only focus on the policy arguments made in support of and
against the enforcement of choice of law clauses. The policy arguments in
favor of enforcing choice of law clauses closely mirror those in support of
forum selection clauses, where, as indicated at the outset of this Article,
courts have pitted the values of individual autonomy and economic efficiency against federalism and a state’s right to choose how it protects its
consumers.
II. THE NEW YORK FEDERAL CASE: BRODSKY V. MATCH.COM

03/25/2015 13:32:44

70. See Brodsky v. Match.com L.L.C., No. 09 Civ. 5328(NRB), 2009 WL 3490277, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2009).
71. Id. at *1.
72. Id.
73. Id. at *4.
74. Id. at *3–5.
75. Id. at *2–3.
76. Id. at *2.
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Brodsky v. Match.com is one of the primary Match.com cases at odds
with the Illinois decision, Jane Doe.70 In Brodsky, former Match.com subscribers filed a class action lawsuit in 2009 against Match.com in a New
York federal court alleging various causes of action arising from their experiences with the online dating website and service.71 In response,
Match.com filed a motion to transfer the case to the Northern District of
Texas pursuant to the forum selection clause in Match.com’s Terms of Use
Agreement.72 Like in the Illinois case, Match.com’s contract with its New
York subscribers failed to comply with several requirements of New
York’s Dating Services Law.73
Despite this failure to comply with the Dating Services Law, the
Brodsky court held that the forum selection clause was valid and enforceable—advancing both legal and public policy justifications.74 From the legal
standpoint, the Brodsky court stated that, pursuant to federal precedent,
there is a strong presumption in favor of enforcing forum selection clauses.75 Under federal law, this presumption can be rebutted only if the plaintiff establishes that the enforcement of the forum selection clause would be
“unreasonable or unjust.”76 Instances where the enforcement of a forum
selection clause would be unreasonable include: (1) if the clause was incorporated into the agreement because of fraud or overreaching; (2) if for all
practical purposes the plaintiff would be “deprived of his day in court, due
to the grave inconvenience or unfairness of the selected forum”; (3) if the
plaintiff would be deprived of a remedy; and (4) “if the clauses contravene
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Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Roby v. Corporation of Lloyds, 996 F.2d 1353, 1361 (2d Cir.
Id.
Id. at *2–4.
Id. at *4.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.

03/25/2015 13:32:44

77.
1993)).
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
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a strong public policy of the forum state.”77 Any exceptions to the presumption of enforceability are to be narrowly construed.78
In enforcing Match.com’s forum selection clause, the Brodsky court
analyzed and then rejected each of the exceptions that could rebut the presumption in favor of enforcement.79 When the New York federal court
considered the public policy exception, it acknowledged that “[t]he State of
New York no doubt has a great interest in protecting its consumers and in
seeing its laws enforced.”80 However, after weighing the interests for and
against enforcement, the court concluded that “New York’s interest in protecting its consumers and businesses does not override its policy of enforcing forum selection clauses.”81 This is where the Brodsky court’s legal
justification for enforcing Match.com’s forum selection clause (i.e., the
federal presumption in favor of enforcement) intertwined with its public
policy justifications.
The Brodsky court relied on two familiar public policy arguments—
individual autonomy and economic efficiency—in concluding that the presumption in favor of enforcement outweighed New York’s interest in protecting its consumers and enforcing its laws.82 The first policy argument
was essentially that individuals have the right to contract and negotiate the
terms of their commercial relationships with one another, freely exchanging one benefit (requiring parties to sue in a specific state) for another benefit (lower prices for consumers).83 In that regard, once parties reach an
agreement, they cannot then change the terms of the agreement when they
merely find it convenient to do so; such behavior is not only unfair to the
contracting parties and their expectations, but goes against basic contract
law principles holding parties to the terms of their agreements.84 In the
court’s words: “plaintiffs cannot avoid compliance with the forum selection
clause to which they validly assented simply by invoking a statute peculiar
to the forum in which they filed suit (expressly in defiance of the forum
selection clause).”85 Permitting such behavior “defies reason,” as a plaintiff
“may circumvent forum selection . . . clauses merely by stating claims un-
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der laws not recognized by the forum selected in the agreement.”86 This
behavior ultimately amounts to forum shopping by the plaintiff.87
The second policy argument involved economic efficiency and practicality. The Brodsky court explained that it was “reasonable and legitimate”
for Match.com, which operates a website and service available “to users
anywhere in the country,” to require that disputes arising from its service
be resolved in Texas, where the company is headquartered.88 Further, the
court stated that Match.com had “no practical alternative than to include a
forum selection and choice of law clause in its User Agreement, since otherwise Match[.com] could potentially be subject to suit in any of the fifty
states arising from its website or service.”89
But Brodsky misinterprets the existing federal law and the broad application of the public policy exception by state courts. Moreover, while the
public policy reasons justifying the enforcement of forum selection clauses
certainly have merit, particularly as the world economy continues to innovate and globalize, they fail to respect the well-established principles of
federalism.
III. WHY ILLINOIS GOT IT RIGHT: LEGAL REASONS
A. There is a “Public Policy” Exception to the Presumption in Favor
of Forum Selection Clauses

Id. (quoting Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353, 1360 (2d Cir. 1993).
See infra Part IV.A.
Brodsky, 2009 WL 3490277, at *4.
Id.
See infra Part III.A.1.i-iii.
Roby, 996 F.2d at 1363.
See infra Part III.A.1.iii.
See infra Part III.B.
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90.
91.
92.
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A number of federal courts have enforced forum selection clauses in
conflict with state consumer protection laws on the grounds that forum
selection clauses are presumptively valid and enforceable pursuant to federal and state common law.90 Federal and state courts, including those in
Illinois, have held that forum selection clauses are presumptively valid and
enforceable “unless unreasonable under the circumstances.”91 However,
these same courts have also repeatedly held that the presumption is not
absolute; there is a public policy exception.92 The public policy exception
appears to be designed to acknowledge concerns of federalism.93 Understanding the historical development of forum selection clauses at both the
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federal and state level and the current state of the law today can shed light
on why the holding and reasoning in Brodsky is misguided.
1. Historical Development of Forum Selection Clauses
Historically, most federal and state courts viewed forum selection
clauses with hostility, often refusing to enforce them because they were
“contrary to public policy.”94 The theory underlying this view was that
forum selection clauses permitted private parties to impermissibly “oust”
the constitutionally or statutorily established jurisdiction of a court through
contractual agreement.95 However, the judicial hostility toward forum selection clauses began to fade in the 1950s, as some courts embraced the
notion of freedom of contract.96 This change in attitude is reflected in the
landmark case of M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore.97
a. Presumption in Favor of Forum Selection Clauses in Federal
Courts

03/25/2015 13:32:44

94. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972); see also Francis M. Dougherty,
Annotation, Validity of Contractual Provision Limiting Place or Court in Which Action May Be
Brought, 31 A.L.R. 4TH 404, 409–14 (1984) (citing numerous state court cases pre-1972 that invalidated forum selection clauses on the grounds that they were contrary to public policy).
95. See, e.g., Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300–01 (5th Cir. 1958)
(“agreements in advance of controversy whose object is to oust the jurisdiction of the courts are contrary to public policy and will not be enforced.”).
96. See Young Lee, Note, Forum Selection Clauses: Problems of Enforcement in Diversity Cases
and State Courts, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 663, 666 (1997) (discussing why the judicial view of
forum selection clauses began to change in the mid-twentieth century).
97. 407 U.S. at 1, 9–10.
98. Id. at 2.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 4, 13, 17.
101. Id. at 3–4.
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In 1972, the United States Supreme Court addressed the validity of forum selections clauses.98 In M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore, a German
ship towing company entered into a contract with an American company to
tow an ocean-moving drilling rig from Louisiana to Italy.99 The contract
between the parties included a forum selection clause mandating that all
litigation arising from the agreement take place in London, a supposed
neutral forum with an expertise in admiralty disputes.100 During transport,
the American company’s rig was damaged off the coast of Florida. The
American company disregarded the forum selection clause and brought suit
in a Florida federal court.101
The Court declined to follow the traditional attitude regarding forum
selection clauses, instead holding that such clauses are “prima facie valid
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and should be enforced” unless enforcement is deemed to be “unreasonable
under the circumstances.”102 The Court reasoned that the “oust[er]” argument was a “vestigial legal fiction” and had “little place” in a world where
courts are overloaded and where many local businesses now operate on a
global scale.103 Following the Supreme Court decision in Bremen, federal
courts adopted a strong presumption across the federal courts that forum
selection clauses are valid absent several limited exceptions,104 discussed
above in Part II.
b. Presumption in Favor of Forum Selection Clauses in State Courts
Although the Bremen decision arose under the federal courts’ admiralty jurisdiction in the context of international commercial contracts and thus
has had no binding effect on state courts,105 its analysis has had an enormous impact on subsequent state court litigation.106 Most state courts, including those in Illinois,107 have followed the Supreme Court’s lead
declaring forum selection clauses presumptively valid.108 Only a handful of
jurisdictions still hold that forum selection clauses are per se invalid and
unenforceable.109

36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 170 Side B
03/25/2015 13:32:44

102. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 12.
104. See Michael Mousa Karayanni, The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of Forum
Selection Clauses, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 1009, 1013 (1996).
105. See Michael D. Moberly & Carolyn F. Burr, Enforcing Forum Selection Clauses in State
Court, 39 SW. U. L. REV. 265, 269 (2009); see also Prof’l Ins. Corp. v. Sutherland, 700 So. 2d 347, 350
(Ala. 1997) (“Bremen does not mandate that state courts enforce forum selection provisions outside of
an admiralty context.”).
106. Moberly & Burr, supra note 105, at 276.
107. See, e.g., Scentura Creations, Inc. v. Long, 756 N.E.2d 451, 456 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (“An
express choice-of-law provision contained in a contract will be given effect subject to certain limitations.”).
108. See Sutherland, 700 So. 2d at 350 (“[T]he courts of almost all . . . jurisdictions . . . now find
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in M/S Bremen on this issue to be persuasive.”); Walter W. Heiser,
Forum Selection Clauses in State Courts: Limitations on Enforcement After Stewart and Carnival
Cruise, 45 FLA. L. REV. 361, 371 (1993) (“the vast majority of state courts have held that contractual
forum selection clauses are valid and enforceable”).
109. See Lee, supra note 96, at 680; see also High Life Sales Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 823
S.W.2d 493, 496 (Mo. 1992) (holding that Missouri conclude “no longer treat[s] outbound forum
selection clauses as per se violations of public policy”); Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses
and the Privatization of Procedure, 25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 51, 72 (1992) (stating that only “[a] handful
of states either hold [forum selection] clauses unenforceable per se or seem to apply a presumption
against their validity”).
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c. The Public Policy Exception
As both federal and state courts have acknowledged, the presumption
in favor of forum selection clauses is not absolute.110 In Bremen, the Supreme Court provided a broad outline of the circumstances in which courts
may refuse to enforce forum selection clauses.111 The Court deemed that
such clauses may be void if they were obtained by fraud, undue influence
or unconscionable means,112 or if the designated forum was so substantially
inconvenient or unfair that it would deprive the plaintiff of his or her “day
in court.”113 The Court also held that such clauses may be void and unenforceable “if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the
forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or judicial decision.”114 The majority of federal and state jurisdictions agree that a public
policy exception to the enforcement of forum selection clauses exists.115
Illinois is no different. In First National Bank of Springfield v. Malpractice Research, Inc.,116 the Illinois Supreme Court made clear that contracts are void and unenforceable if they are “clearly contrary” to Illinois
public policy as declared by its constitution, statutes, and the decisions of
its courts.117 When holding that Match.com’s forum selection clause was
void and unenforceable, the Illinois court in Jane Doe was simply applying
the public policy exception—an exception recognized by both Illinois and
federal courts. Given the almost universal recognition of the public policy
exception to the enforcement of forum selection clauses, why did the two
Match.com cases reach different results?

36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 171 Side A
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110. See Karayanni, supra note 104, at 1017–20 (explaining that “[t]he presumption in favor of
enforcement of forum selection clauses . . . was not absolute, as the Bremen Court “noted that public
policy was one of the exceptions set by the Court to the enforcement of forum [selection] clauses).
111. Karayanni, supra note 104, at 1010–12.
112. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13–15 (1972); Phillips v. Audio Active
Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 384 (2d Cir. 2007).
113. See, e.g., Gamayo v. Match.com L.L.C., Nos. C 11-00762 SBA, C 11-1076 SBA, C 11-1206
SBA, 2011 WL 3739542, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011); Brodsky v. Match.com L.L.C., No. 09 Civ.
5328(NRB), 2009 WL 3490277, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2009).
114. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15 (emphasis added).
115. See, e.g., Scentura Creations, Inc. v. Long, 756 N.E.2d 451, 456–57 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)
(citing McAllister v. Smith, 17 Ill. 328, 334 (1856)) (noting that the Illinois Supreme Court has held
that forum selection clauses are invalid and unenforceable if they are deemed to be “contrary to the
public policy of the local government”).
116. First Nat. Bank of Springfield v. Malpractice Research, Inc., 688 N.E.2d 1179, 1182 (Ill.
1997) (quoting Schuman-Heink v. Folsom, 159 N.E. 250 (1927)).
117. Id.
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2. Statutory Preemption: A Split Between the Courts
Despite the almost universal recognition of the public policy exception
to the enforcement of forum selection clauses, courts differ as to the scope
and application of the exception.118 Some state courts have interpreted the
scope and application of the public policy exception more broadly than
their federal counterparts.119 Analyzing the difference in how some federal
and state courts have decided the fate of forum selection clauses at odds
with state “anti-waiver” provisions is illustrative of the point.120
In the federal case Luv2bfit, Inc. v. Curves International, Inc.,121 the
plaintiffs, thirty-five current or former owners of a New York fitness franchise, filed suit in a New York federal court against a Texas-based franchiser. 122 The franchiser moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, transfer
the case to a Texas court pursuant to two forum selection clauses contained
in the contract between the parties.123 The New York federal court enforced
the forum selection clause and transferred the case to Texas, despite the
existence of an anti-waiver provision in New York’s business protection
statute.124 The court reasoned that to interpret the “anti-waiver provision to
mean that [the plaintiffs] cannot be required to contractually consent to
litigating this case in a forum other than New York . . . is too broad a reading of the [New York Franchise Sales Act (NYFSA)].”125 The court suggested that to be held unenforceable, the language of the NYFSA had to
“implicitly or explicitly” prohibit a New York franchisee from agreeing to
resolve their disputes in other forums.126 Other federal courts have reiterated the same narrow interpretation—that a statute must expressly prohibit
the parties from agreeing to litigate their disputes in another forum.127
36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 171 Side B
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118. See, e.g., Moberly & Burr, supra note 105, at 306–07.
119. See also id. at 301, 304.
120. Compare Pong v. Am. Capital Holdings, Inc., No. CIV. S-06-2527 LKK/DAD, 2007 WL
657790, at *5–7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2007) (holding that a forum selection clause did not violate the
anti-waiver statute in securities fraud actions), with Hall v. Super. Ct., 197 Cal. Rptr. 757, 761–63 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1983) (holding forum selection clause void because it was in conflict with the anti-waiver
provision in California’s Corporate Securities Law).
121. Luv2bfit, Inc. v. Curves Int’l Inc., No. 06 CV 15415(CSH), 2008 WL 4443961 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 29, 2008).
122. Id. at *1–2.
123. Id.
124. Id. at *3, *6.
125. Id. at *3.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595–97 (1991) (concluding that
the forum selection clause was enforceable because there was no prohibition against forum selection
clauses in the language of the Limitation of Vessel Owner’s Liability Act or its legislative history);
Long John Silver’s Inc. v. Nickleson, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (W.D. Ky. 2013) (holding that “[t]he
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[Minnesota Franchise Act’s (MFA)] anti-waiver provision voids anything in a franchise agreement or
contract that explicitly waives . . . the MFA”).
128. Morris v. Towers Fin. Corp., 916 P.2d 678 (Colo. App. 1996).
129. Id. at 679.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 679 (emphasis added) (citing M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)).
133. Id.
134. Id. (citing Lambdin v. Dist. Ct., 903 P.2d 1126 (Colo. 1995)).
135. Id. (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-4-125 (West 2003)).
136. Id.
137. Cf. Adams Reload Co. v. Int’l Profit Assoc., 143 P.3d 1056, 1059 (Colo. App. 2005) (holding
that because there was no anti-waiver provision in the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, the forum
selection clause did not necessarily violate Colorado public policy and would be enforced).

36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 172 Side A

By contrast, in Morris v. Towers Financial Corp.,128 a Colorado state
court held the opposite, deciding that the anti-waiver provision in the Colorado Wage Claim Act (CWCA) was sufficient to invalidate an employer’s
forum selection clause.129 In that case, the employer attempted to dismiss
the employee’s wage claim, arguing that New York was the exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to their employment contract.130 Relying on the public
policy exception outlined in Bremen, the Colorado court held that the employer’s forum selection clause was void because it violated the strong
public policy of Colorado embodied in the CWCA and was directly in conflict with the CWCA’s anti-waiver provision.131
Like the Illinois court in Jane Doe and the numerous Illinois courts
before that, the Colorado court did the simple math. Under Bremen and its
progeny, forum selection clauses are presumptively enforceable unless
enforcement would “contravene a strong public policy of the forum in
which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial decision.”132 The public policy of the forum, here Colorado, was embodied in
its statutes, such as the CWCA.133 As explained by the Morris court, the
CWCA “provides a clear, comprehensive statutory scheme designed to
require employers to pay wages earned by their employees in a timely
manner.”134 The CWCA also includes an anti-waiver provision, declaring
that “any agreement, written or oral, by an employee purporting to waive or
to modify his rights” under the CWCA is void and unenforceable.135 Accordingly, the forum selection clause could not be enforced.136 However,
had there been no express anti-waiver provision prohibiting employers and
employees from attempting to waive compliance with the CWCA, the Colorado court may have reached a different result.137
Illinois and Colorado courts are not alone in their decisions. Other
state courts, such as those in California, have similarly held that anti-waiver
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provisions in state statutes invalidate forum selection clauses.138 The trend
of state courts interpreting the Bremen public policy exception more broadly can be partially explained by provincial attitudes and federalism.139 That
is, “state courts are likely to be more familiar with, and therefore more
protective of,” their own state’s policies and laws.140 State courts are also
more distrusting of courts in foreign jurisdictions and, therefore, may be
hesitant to permit foreign jurisdictions to decide whether to enforce their
state’s laws.141 It is also important to note that the “presence of a strong
state policy disfavoring forum selection clause[s]” is not binding on federal
courts as it is on state courts; indeed, such state policies are just “one of
many factors” which federal courts must consider.142
In sum, the Illinois court in Jane Doe v. Match.com had the authority
to refuse to enforce Match.com’s forum selection clause pursuant to the
public policy exception outlined in Bremen. For Illinois state courts, as well
as other state courts across the country, it is immaterial whether there is a
split amongst the courts as to the scope and application of the public policy
exception. The fact remains that the exception exists. If Congress wants to
create a hard rule requiring states to enforce forum selection clauses, even
if they conflict with state laws, it needs to pass legislation to that end and
clarify the existing uncertainty in the law.143 Without Congress stepping in,
states will (and should) continue to have the right to decide how they want
to protect their consumers. An examination into the principles of federalism
provides insight into why states have this right.

36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 172 Side B
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138. See, e.g., Hall v. Super. Ct., 197 Cal. Rptr. 757, 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (“California’s
policy to protect securities investors, without more, would probably justify denial of enforcement of the
choice of forum provision . . . but section 25701, which renders void any provision purporting to waive
or evade the Corporate Securities Law, removes that discretion and compels denial of enforcement.”);
Rose v. Etling, 467 P.2d 633, 634–35 (Or. 1970) (Oregon Supreme Court held that Oregon retail buyers
entering retail installment contracts could not waive, even by agreement, any remedies granted to the
retail buyer under Oregon law).
139. See infra Part III.B.
140. See Moberly & Burr, supra note 105, at 306–07.
141. See id. at 304–07.
142. Elite Physicians Serv., L.L.C. v. Citicorp Payment Serv., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-344, 2006 WL
752536, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 17, 2006).
143. Lee, supra note 96, at 681 (explaining that “[w]ith no federal statute that preempts state law
on forum selection clauses,” defendants have “no recourse” despite any agreements they made with the
plaintiffs to resolve their disputes in a specific forum).
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B. Federalism Gives States the Right to Decide for Themselves How to
Protect Their Consumers
Under the existing legal system, there is no legal authority for federal
courts to preempt state consumer protection laws, regardless of how persuasive the policy arguments in favor of enforcement are.
1. History of Federalism

03/25/2015 13:32:44

144. William J. Woodward, Jr., Finding the Contract in Contracts for Law, Forum and Arbitration, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 1, 45 n.152 (2006) [hereinafter Woodward, Finding the Contract].
145. Ellis Katz, American Federalism: Past, Present and Future, 2 ISSUES OF DEMOCRACY:
REINVENTING AM. FEDERALISM 9 (1997), available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itdhr/0497/ijde/ijde0497.pdf.
146. Linda R. Monk, Federalism, CONSTITUTION USA WITH PETER SAGAL,
http://www.pbs.org/tpt/constitution-usa-peter-sagal/federalism/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).
147. Id.
148. Katz, supra note 145, at 9.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 10.
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Preempting state consumer protection laws violates the very core of
the United States’ federal system.144 To understand America’s federal system and how it relates to consumer protection laws, this Part will briefly
discuss the origins and development of our federal system. The creation of
the concept of federalism dates back to the American Revolution. In 1776,
the thirteen colonies declared independence from Great Britain.145 While
the newly independent states shared the goal of independence; they also
had strained relations, as they differed greatly in history, geography, population, economy, and politics.146 Many of the states wanted to retain the
powers of a sovereign nation (i.e., the ability to make treaties, receive ambassadors, and regulate commerce).147 However, the states recognized that
in order to win the war and survive on the world stage, they had to coordinate their military efforts and cooperate with one another on a number of
important issues.148
After the Americans won the Revolutionary War, there was a real
danger that the emerging country would fall apart, as states pursued their
own interests rather than the national interests of the United States.149 In
1787, “George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and
other [American] leaders” sought to strengthen the country and better define the relationship between the states and the national government.150
Delegates from the states were summoned to Philadelphia, where they suc-
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151. Monk, supra note 146.
152. Katz, supra note 145, at 10.
153. Id.
154. THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at *3 (Alexander Hamilton), available at Westlaw 1787 WL 356.
155. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at *1 (James Madison), available at Westlaw 1788 WL 460.
156. Joseph C. Cove, The Relationship between the Federal Government and Local Government, 5
MASS. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 1, § 5.1 (2012) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton)).
157. Id.
158. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
159. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking
Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 564 (2007) (“The Tenth
Amendment tells us that there [are] realms of respective state and federal authority, without squarely
telling us what powers lie in which realm.”).
160. See Katz, supra note 145, at 13; Ryan, supra note 159, at 523.
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cessfully drafted the Constitution and introduced the notion of “federalism.”151
In the United States’ federal system, “the people retain their basic
sovereignty and they delegate some powers to the national government and
reserve other powers for the states.”152 “Individuals are citizens of both the
national government and their respective states.”153 One of the goals of
creating a federal system was to permit both levels of government—state
and federal—to protect the rights of citizens in case either body of government became too powerful and tyrannical. As Alexander Hamilton explained in the Federalist Papers, “If [the peoples’] rights are invaded by
either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress.”154
Likewise, James Madison stated that the national and state governments
“are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with
different powers, and designed for different purposes.”155 Another purpose
of creating a federal system was to protect the local autonomy of the
states.156 “From these Constitutional origins, federal case law has developed a body of law giving deference to local rights,” including “the right of
a state to enforce its own laws in its own courts . . . .”157
The Constitution expressly outlines which powers the federal government possesses. These powers include the right to levy taxes, declare war,
and regulate interstate and foreign commerce.158 While the Constitution
does not explicitly say which powers are allocated to the states, it makes
clear through the Tenth Amendment that: “[t]he powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”159 Powers traditionally
left to the states include the power to police citizens, run local schools,
regulate public utilities and services, and establish rules governing contracts.160
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There are many other powers traditionally exercised by the states
which are actually powers shared by both the national and state governments.161 The Framers of the Constitution anticipated that there would be
some overlap between state and federal powers, and consequently there
could be conflict between their laws. To provide clarity in such situations,
the Framers included a “Supremacy Clause,” declaring that if a state law
conflicts with a federal law enacted pursuant to a constitutionally enumerated power, the federal law is controlling.162 The Supremacy Clause is particularly significant to this Article’s discussion because it gives the federal
government the power to preempt state consumer protection laws through
federal laws enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause.163 However, in
situations where it is uncertain whether state law is preempted,
“[c]onstitutional theory favors the absence of preemption on the rationale
that it is better to presume local authority, and if such presumption causes
difficulties Congress can always enforce its legislative purpose by remedial
legislation rather than subordinating local authority to the federal interest.”164
2. The Lack of Federal Legislation

03/25/2015 13:32:44

161. See Ryan, supra note 159, at 541.
162. Id.
163. Karayanni, supra note 104, at 1032–33.
164. Cove, supra note 156, § 5.5.2.
165. Edward M. Crane, Nicholas J. Eichenseer & Emma S. Glazer, U.S. Consumer Protection
Law: A Federalist Patchwork, 78 DEFENSE COUNS. J. 305, 306 (2011).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 306–07.
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To date, there is no federal legislation mandating the enforcement of
forum selection and choice of law clauses. While the “Constitution does
not [directly] address the authority of the federal government to protect
consumers,” the federal government nonetheless possesses this power
through its ability to regulate interstate domestic commerce.165 Prior to
1900, the federal government rarely passed federal consumer protection
laws.166 Instead, the responsibility of protecting consumers rested with the
states and local municipalities.167 However, as the country became more
industrialized and manufactured goods increasingly streamed across state
borders, the federal government began to step in, passing legislation targeting specific categories of consumer products and unfair business practices
(e.g., laws regulating trade, food, drugs, and banking).168
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169. 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2014).
170. James Zimmerman, Restrictions on Forum-Selection Clauses in Franchise Agreements and
the Federal Arbitration Act: Is State Law Preempted?, 51 VAND. L. REV. 759, 763 (1998).
171. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C.A. § 2).
172. Grohn v. Sisters of Charity Health Servs., 960 P.2d 722, 725 (Colo. App. 1998) (quoting 9
U.S.C.A. § 1).
173. Id. at 728 (emphasis added).
174. Zimmerman, supra note 170, at 763–64.
175. See e.g., Grohn, 960 P.2d at 727–28.
176. Match.com Terms of Use Agreement, MATCH.COM cl. 19,
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Congress can enact federal legislation stating that forum selection
clauses preempt any state laws to the contrary, including any anti-waiver
provisions. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)169 is illustrative of this
point. In 1925, Congress enacted the FAA “to overrule the existing common law that often invalidated arbitration agreements.”170 “Section 2 of the
FAA proclaims that in all contracts ‘involving commerce,’ an arbitration
agreement ‘shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’”171
The FAA defines “‘commerce’ to include [any] ‘commerce among the
several States or with foreign nations,’” with the intent to interpret the term
“involving commerce” broadly.172 As one court put it, by enacting Section
2 of the FAA, “Congress withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed
to resolve by arbitration.”173 Since the FAA’s enactment, both federal and
state courts have upheld arbitration agreements regardless of state law.174
Notably, when refusing to enforce forum selection clauses, many state
courts have distinguished arbitration agreements from forum selection
clauses by highlighting the lack of federal legislation requiring the enforcement of forum selection clauses.175
There is an important policy reason why only federal legislation can
require state courts to enforce forum selection clauses in conflict with state
laws. When the federal government passes legislation, in theory, all fifty
states have a voice through their representatives in the Senate and House.
Moreover, the entire country may vote for the President of the United
States, who can veto any federal bill. However, the same justification does
not apply on the state level because state legislators have no say in the laws
passed by legislators in other states. With the lack of any federal legislation
mandating the enforcement of forum selection clauses and the resulting
uncertainty in the federal and state courts as to when such clauses can be
enforced, it is not surprising that Match.com has recently opted to include
an arbitration clause in its Terms of Use Agreement.176 Clause 19 of
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Match.com’s 2014 Terms of Use Agreement states: “The exclusive means
of resolving any dispute or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement (including any alleged breach thereof), the Service, or the Website
shall be BINDING ARBITRATION administered by the American Arbitration Association.”177
However, federal legislation is not the only solution for clarifying the
uncertainty in the law. As exemplified by the creation of the Uniform
Commercial Code, states can pass model codes similar to one another if
they believe such model codes would be mutually beneficial to all the participant states. Given that this has not happened yet—at least not successfully—the states seem content with passing and enforcing their own
consumer protection laws, which they deem best suited for their residents.
3. Making Trade-offs

03/25/2015 13:32:44

http://www.match.com/registration/membagr.aspx (last revised Feb. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Match.com
2014 Terms of Use Agreement].
177. Id. (emphasis in original).
178. Crane, Eichenseer & Glazer, supra note 165, at 305.
179. Id. at 305–06.
180. Id.
181. Woodward, Constraining Opt-Outs, supra note 29, at 11–14.
182. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49–50 (1973).
183. Id. at 50 (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
184. Eric Gwinn, How do I catch a Valentine?, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 5, 2008,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-02-05/features/0802040358_1.
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The IDRSA is a consumer protection statute. Unlike many foreign jurisdictions, the United States does not have a single, comprehensive code
outlining its consumer protection laws.178 Rather, consumer protection laws
in the United States are a “patchwork” of often interrelated and overlapping
federal and state laws.179 This patchwork is not by accident; it is the consequence of the United States’ federal system.180
While permitting each of the fifty states to create their own consumer
protection laws can be burdensome for businesses engaged in interstate
trade, it is the trade-off of our federal system.181 In fact, having differences
amongst the states regarding what is the best trade-off is not only acceptable, but also encouraged.182 As the United States Supreme Court has emphasized, one of the biggest strengths of the “Nation-State relationship in
our federal system” is the freedom provided to states to “serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments.”183 In the online dating context, the states “as a laboratory” concept is illustrated by the
increase in various online dating services laws across the country.184 As
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millions of Americans have begun to use online dating websites, and concerns for online safety have risen, states have experimented with differing
levels of protection, with some states even requiring online dating services
to disclose their criminal background screening practices.185
Moreover, the Framers of the Constitution expected that states would
be the principal lawmakers in the federal system when it came to domestic
issues.186 This theory was in recognition of the belief that “law arises out of
the need to address distinctly local problems” and, in that vein, states were
best suited for solving the problems in their own backyards, as they are
most familiar with their own distinct geography, economy, and population.187 Accordingly, without federal legislation mandating the enforcement
of forum selection clauses, states can continue to make their own trade-offs
and decide for themselves how they want to protect their consumers.
IV. WHY ILLINOIS GOT IT RIGHT: PUBLIC POLICY REASONS
The courts that have enforced forum selection clauses in conflict with
state consumer protection laws have based their decision on primarily public policy grounds.188 Lacking federal legislation, these courts simply engaged in a weighing of values, where individual autonomy and economic
efficiency arguments outweighed any federalism concerns.189 This Article
takes the opposite position because: first, the public policy arguments cited
in Bremen are less persuasive in personal injury cases involving contracts
of adhesion; second, there is a risk of wholesale displacement of state consumer protections laws; and third, consumers are at an even greater disadvantage vis-à-vis big business.

The Bremen court and its progeny have highlighted numerous policy
reasons for enforcing forum selection clauses, including economic efficiency, party autonomy, and practicality (in an era of increasing globalization).190 As discussed above,191 the Brodsky court drew on many of the
same policy arguments.
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185. Id.
186. Katz, supra note 145, at 10.
187. Cove, supra note 156, § 5.1 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton)).
188. See, e.g., Brodsky v. Match.com L.L.C., No. 09 Civ. 5328 (NRB), 2009 WL 3490277, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2009).
189. See supra Part II.
190. See, e.g., Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353, 1363 (2d Cir. 1993).
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A. The Public Policy Arguments Cited in Bremen are Less Persuasive
in Personal Injury Cases Involving Contracts of Adhesion
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191. See supra Part II.
192. Lee, supra note 96, at 664.
193. See Roby, 996 F.2d at 1363.
194. Karayanni, supra note 104, at 1009.
195. Id.
196. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972) (“The elimination of all such
uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element
in international trade, commerce, and contracting.”).
197. Roby, 996 F.2d at 1363.
198. Karayanni, supra note 104, at 1009.
199. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–94 (1991).
200. Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum
Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 700, 700 (1992).
201. Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 593–94.
202. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972).

36219-ckt_90-2 Sheet No. 176 Side A

First, these proponents argue that forum selection clauses play an important role in providing predictability and certainty for parties in commercial relationships,192 leading to the smooth functioning and growth of
interstate and international commerce.193 In agreeing to litigate future disputes in a specific forum, parties are able to plan ahead and consider the
risks and costs associated with a business transaction should unforeseen
problems develop.194 Parties are also able to choose a forum that is convenient, neutral, and possesses expertise in the related business.195 As numerous courts have emphasized, providing predictability and certainty is
particularly important in the international context,196 where a potential defendant can face tremendous burdens if he is forced to litigate disputes
under unexpectedly distant and/or hostile forums and laws.197
Second, these proponents argue that forum selection clauses provide
economic advantages to both businesses and the courts.198 Simply put, predictability and certainty lead to reduced transaction costs.199 For example,
through the use of standard form contracts, businesses can mandate that all
litigation related to a product or service take place in a specific state or
county, allowing businesses to enhance efficiency and reduce costs by consolidating actions and retaining the same local counsel.200 Similarly, by
enforcing forum selection clauses, litigants are also spared the time and
expense of determining the correct forum through pretrial motions, thereby
further conserving limited judicial resources.201 The conservation of judicial resources is particularly beneficial in an era where many American
courts are “overloaded,”202 and where debt-ridden federal and state governments are continually trying to cut down on unnecessary spending.
Third, proponents argue that in addition to businesses and the courts,
consumers benefit as well. This is because predictability and lower transac-
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203. Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 594 (explaining that passengers purchasing cruise tickets
containing the forum selection clause likely got reduced prices “reflecting the savings that the cruise
line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be sued.”).
204. Id.
205. M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 11 (explaining that a favorable approach toward forum selection
clauses “accords with ancient concepts of freedom of contract and reflects an appreciation of the expanding horizons of American contractors who seek business in all parts of the world”).
206. See Gen. Instrument Corp. v. Tie Mfg., 517 F. Supp. 1231, 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (“[t]he
bench and bar has always regarded choice of forum as a significant right.”).
207. See Lee, supra note 96, at 666.
208. See M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12.
209. Metro E. Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Commc’n Int’l, Inc., 294 F.3d 924, 929
(7th Cir. 2002).
210. See also Omron Healthcare, Inc. v. Maclaren Exports Ltd., 28 F.3d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 1994)
(presuming that a party who has agreed to litigate abroad has received some compensation for the risk);
Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353, 1363 (2d Cir. 1993) (reasoning that forum agreements should
principally be enforceable because the financial effect of a forum selection clause will be reflected in
the value of the contract).
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tion costs often result in lower prices for consumers.203 For example, a
$1,000 ticket for a cruise would likely cost more if the cruise line had to
consider the potential costs of litigating a suit anywhere in the United
States, as such litigation could be expensive and would certainly impact the
company’s profits.204
Lastly, proponents argue that forum selection clauses should be enforced because notions of individual freedom to contract and individual
autonomy are at the root of the American judicial system.205 They concede
that a litigant’s right to select a forum to bring suit is unquestionably a valuable right,206 but argue that individual parties should have the freedom to
control the terms and expectations of their commercial relationships with
one another,207 and bargain away certain rights when they deem it beneficial to do so.208 As one federal court put it, “One aspect of personal liberty
is the entitlement to exchange statutory rights for something valued more
highly.”209 Accordingly, when forum selection clauses are included in contracts, proponents argue that they are often bargained for in consideration
for some other benefits, such as a reduced cost in product or service, and
thus accurately reflect the negotiated value of the contract as a whole.210 By
refusing to enforce forum selection clauses, courts would be permitting
certain parties to receive better deals than either party intended or bargained for.
Undoubtedly, the policy arguments in Bremen and its progeny have
some merit. As the world economy globalizes and competition among
businesses increases, the United States and its legal system must adapt to
ensure the country’s continued growth and innovative edge. There is a legitimate concern that substantial increases in legal costs (and other associ-
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211. PACER, https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/login.pl (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).
212. The benefits associated with forum selection clauses are quite clear in cases involving freely
negotiated contracts between sophisticated commercial entities. However, the same benefits may not
apply in cases involving unsophisticated consumers who “agreed” to the terms of a forum selection
clause through a click-wrap agreement (which they likely did not read).
213. Karayanni, supra note 104, at 1040.
214. Id.
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ated burdens) could negatively impact American businesses and, in turn,
hamper the country’s economic growth and entrepreneurial spirit. The increased burdens and costs described above could likely be swallowed by
larger businesses, such as Match.com, who have teams of attorneys to ensure compliance with local laws and litigate in remote places; the same
cannot be said about smaller businesses, which typically do not have the
same resources. Still, technology is a two-way street. It has not only
brought businesses and consumers from across the world together, thereby
increasing interstate and international litigation, but it has also been a driving force in reducing the costs of litigation. For example, with digital technologies like Skype, depositions can be taken remotely, saving parties both
time and money. Similarly, with the advent of the Internet and more sophisticated government websites and databases, court documents, such as
pleadings and motions, can be filed online in many courtrooms across the
country.211
While the policy arguments made in Bremen and its progeny certainly
do raise important concerns, they should not be determinative to the issues
at hand. Specifically, the economic efficiency and freedom of contract policy arguments are not equally persuasive in all circumstances. When determining whether to enforce forum selection clauses, courts must consider
the type of parties involved in the contract, the circumstances in which the
contract was agreed to, and the nature of the dispute.212 There is a stark
difference between presuming the enforcement of forum selection clauses
freely assented to and bargained for by sophisticated commercial entities,
such as the contract between the parties in Bremen, and presuming the enforcement of forum selection clauses in personal injury cases involving
contracts of adhesion, such as the contract at issue in the Match.com cases.
First, personal injury claims are distinguishable from contract disputes. As a matter of principle, courts have “recognized that the interests of
protecting and preserving human life weigh heavily when compared with
that of protecting the economic integrity of various entities.”213 Accordingly, in situations “where one must decide whether to implement a certain
norm aimed at protecting the physical integrity of humans or one aimed at
protecting economic welfare, preference should be given to the former.”214
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215. Andrew A. Schwartz, Consumer Contract Exchanges and the Problem of Adhesion, 28 YALE
J. ON REG. 313, 346 (2011).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 347.
219. Lucille M. Ponte, Getting a Bad Rap? Unconscionability in Clickwrap Dispute Resolution
Clauses and a Proposal for Improving the Quality of These Online Consumer “Products”, 26 OHIO ST.
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 119, 160–61 (2011).
220. Id. at 160.
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In that vein, torts are inherently more personal and thus more local. For
example, in Jane Doe, Jane was allegedly raped in Chicago, where the
lawsuit was filed. All of the witnesses were in Chicago as well as the assailant, Ryan Logan. In Jane’s personal injury lawsuit, where Ryan Logan
was also named as a defendant, a Texas court would not have had subject
matter jurisdiction over the suit or personal jurisdiction over Ryan. Ultimately, there would need to be two trials, one in Chicago, Illinois, and one
in Dallas, Texas. By contrast, had Jane Doe sued Match.com over a payment dispute, there would have been a weaker personal connection to Chicago. While Match.com advertised in Chicago to Chicago-area residents,
and the contract was entered into in Chicago, a contract dispute over payment does not strike the same inherently local and deeply personal nerve
associated with sexual assault or rape. And from a fairness standpoint, it
does not seem right that the victim of an assault, battery, or any other similar tort be forced to bear the burden of extra travel costs and related expenses.
Second, it is important to distinguish contracts of adhesion from those
contracts that are freely negotiated. “Contracts of adhesion” are standard
form contracts presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, “usually presented to
a consumer by a business entity.”215 There typically is no contemplation or
negotiation over any of the terms of the contract, which are generally drafted by the “stronger party to the transaction.”216 One familiar example of a
contract of adhesion is the Google Terms of Service Agreement, which
“govern[s] the use of Google’s websites, such as Google search, Gmail, or
YouTube.”217 In these types of contracts, the public policy justifications for
enforcement are diminished because contracts of adhesion, like the clickwrap agreements used by Match.com, are often not “accepted knowingly
and voluntarily (and for consideration).”218 These types of contracts are
often excessively long and contain legalese. The use of small print also
makes them difficult to read and understand.219 Unsurprisingly, most consumers do not read them.220
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B. We Risk the Wholesale Displacement of State Consumer
Protection Laws

Woodward, Finding the Contract, supra note 144, at 45.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 45 n.152.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 40, 45.
Id. at 45.
Id.

03/25/2015 13:32:44
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In addition, by enforcing forum selection and choice of law clauses
promulgated en masse across the country, regardless of whether they conflict with a forum state’s own laws, we risk the wholesale displacement of
state consumer protection laws.221 Through the wide-scale use of forum
selection and choice of law clauses in adhesion contracts, businesses can
choose a state with favorable consumer protection laws and impose those
laws on citizens of the other forty-nine states.222 State legislatures ultimately lose their ability to protect consumers in their own state.
In the article “Finding the Contract in Contracts for Law, Forum and
Arbitration,” William J. Woodward highlights some of the serious problems with allowing businesses to impose a chosen state’s laws on consumers of a different state.223 As Woodward explains, when state lawmakers
determine how much consumer protection they will provide their residents,
they engage in a complicated political process that balances the state’s
interest in protecting its residents with the state’s interest in creating a favorable business environment.224 In theory, a favorable business environment can create more jobs and tax revenue, which can be redistributed to a
state’s residents in the form of lower taxes and other benefits.225 But the
question is: at what cost? States have to make trade-offs, where they create
or give up some level of consumer protection in exchange for a more or
less favorable business environment.226
Under the U.S. federal system, each state can decide for itself the
proper “mix” of consumer protection it provides vis-à-vis its businesses.227
While some states, like Delaware, have prided themselves on a more favorable business environment, other states, like California, have chosen a more
consumer friendly balance, even if it makes the State’s business environment less favorable.228 The system works the way it is designed and is fair
so long as the citizens of a state receive the benefit of the actual “mix” their
state provides.229
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If citizens do not receive the actual “mix” their state provides, and instead receive the “mix” of another state, then the federal balance is upset.230
For illustrative purposes, assume the truth of what many pro-business lobbyists assert—that there is a correlation between a state’s consumer protection laws and its tax level.231 The people living in “high” consumer protecprotection states have higher taxes (in exchange for more protections), and
the people living in “low” consumer protection states have lower taxes (in
exchange for fewer protections).232 If citizens of a “high” consumer protection state are subjected to the laws of a “low” protection state (by forum
selection and choice of law provisions), they receive an unintended, and
often unfair, balance (i.e., high taxes and low consumer protection).233
“Low” regulation states have an incentive to encourage this result because
it makes them even more attractive to businesses.234
C. We Put Consumers at an Even Greater Disadvantage Vis-à-Vis Big
Business
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230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Shauhin Talesh, How the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in the Twenty-First Century, 62 DEPAUL
L. REV. 519, 519 (2013).
236. Id. at 523–24.
237. Id. at 523.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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Similarly, states risk putting their citizens at an even greater disadvantage vis-à-vis big business, which already dictates the terms of their
interactions with consumers. Generally, businesses, as “repeat players” in
the legal system, have huge advantages over consumers in dispute resolution. 235 Businesses have superior economic power and resources, enjoy
economies of scale, and, through repetitive interactions, can develop
friendly and cooperative relationships with court officials and the courts.236
Unlike consumers, who are typically “one-shotters,” businesses engage in
litigation with long-term considerations and try to shape the development
of the law through court precedent.237 Repeat players do not just consider
the immediate financial stakes of an individual dispute.238 Rather, they
often play the odds in their favor by settling cases that would create adverse
precedent and litigating cases that will likely create rules promoting their
interests.239
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In addition to shaping the law through strategic gamesmanship, businesses also shape the law through legislation.240 Unlike consumers, businesses have the money and resources to hire lobbying groups to influence
state and federal legislation. The influence large internet companies has had
on state legislation regarding the behavioral marketing industry is illustrative of the point. As online privacy expert Lori Andrews explains, big data
companies like Facebook and Google give immense sums of money to
politicians to block or influence any legislation against their interests in
collecting user information—and use lobbyists to “strong arm” politicians
they cannot buy.241 The death of several bills in the 1990s that attempted to
protect consumers’ personal information, including an individual’s credit
history, purchases, and travel patterns, supports this argument.242
Accordingly, when consumer protection statutes are passed, states
should be provided the means to enforce those laws, absent federal legislation to the contrary, because it helps equalize the unequal playing field. As
Shauhin Talesh explains in “How the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in the
Twenty-First Century,” legislatures pass consumer protection and remedial
statutes, in theory, to “bolster the position of one-shotters” and/or protect
disadvantaged groups, such as consumers.243 Consumer protection statutes
attempt to equalize the playing field, so to speak, by providing consumers
with fee-shifting, punitive damages, and attainable benchmarks for establishing liability.244
CONCLUSION
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240. Interview by Phawker.com with Lori Andrews, Director, Inst. for Sci., Law & Tech. at Ill.
Inst. of Tech. (Jan. 12, 2013), available at http://www.phawker.com/2012/01/12/qa-with-onlineprivacy-expert-lori-andrews/.
241. Id.
242. William J. Fenrich, Common Law Protection of Individuals’ Rights in Personal Information,
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 951, 987–89 (1996) (explaining how the marketing lobby was able to derail
attempts by the California, New Jersey, and New York legislatures to protect consumers’ personal
information).
243. Talesh, supra note 235, at 526.
244. Id.
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The Illinois court in Jane Doe v. Match.com had the authority to, and
did, refuse to enforce Match.com’s forum selection clause pursuant to the
public policy exception outlined in Bremen. The Brodsky case and other
cases that came to the same conclusion have missed the mark. For Illinois
state courts, as well as other state courts across the country, it is immaterial
whether there is a split amongst the courts as to the scope and application
of the public policy exception. The fact is that the exception exists. To
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preempt state consumer protection laws and any associated anti-waiver
provisions, Congress must pass legislation to that end and clarify the existing uncertainty in the law.245 However, without Congress stepping in, federal courts should respect the principles of federalism and not enforce
forum selection clauses that are in conflict with state consumer protection
laws— at least in personal injury cases involving contracts of adhesion.
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245. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.

